CEO与CFO股权激励的治理效应之比较:基于盈余管理的实证研究

在西方发达国家,CFO与CEO拥有相同的法律地位,负有监督CEO的责任,在公司治理结构中拥有重要的地位。本文从盈余管理角度研究我国CFO股权激励的公司治理效应,并比较CFO与CEO股权激励的公司治理效应,发现:尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理呈负相关关系,而实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理的负相关关系显著变弱;尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率对盈余管理抑制的程度显著小于CEO。这表明,正式实施股权激励会诱发盈余管理行为,其它类型的CFO持股则会抑制盈余管理行为,并且CFO股权激励的积极治理效应显著小于CEO。

The Compare of CFO and CEO Stock Incentives' Corporate Govern ance Effect: An Empirical Analysis Based on Earnings Management

In developed countries,CFOs have the same legal status as CEOs,supervise CEOs,and play an important role in the corporate governance structure.This paper examines CFO stock incentives effect from earnings management,and then analyses the difference effect between CFO stock incentives and CEO stock incentives in China.The paper finds that CFO stock incentives,as measured by the percentage of shares and options in total CFO compensations,are negatively related to earnings management for publicly listed firms which have not implement CFO stock incentive plans.This negative relationship becomes statistically insignificant for firms which have implement CFO stock incentives plans.In addition,CEO stock incentives effect is stronger than CFO stock incentives.The empirical results in this paper indicate that formal CFO stock incentives can encourage the behavior of earnings management,while the others CFO stock holding can restrain it.And the positive governance effect of CFO stock incentives is stronger than that of CEO stock incentives.