不对称成本信息、反倾销威胁与最优出口贸易政策

本文运用两时期信号博弈模型，分析了不对称成本信息对出口贸易政策的影响。研究发现，最优出口贸易政策是出口补贴还是出口税，取决于模型中的成本、政治压力和事先信念参数。在大部分情况下，最优出口补贴水平相对较低。这意味着，反倾销和出口补贴是相互联系的，反倾销威胁会导致出口补贴的出现。为了传递真实成本信息，争取有利的出口贸易政策，低成本企业将产量提高到利润最大化水平以上。这说明最优出口贸易政策的确能起到揭示真实成本信息，从而限制高成本企业倾销行为的作用。

Optimal Export Policy under Asymmetric Information and Threat of Antidumping

This paper examines the optimal export policy-making under the asymmetric information and threat of antidumping duty based on a two-period signaling game model in which firms compete in Cournot fashion and the policy-makers intervene at the same time.It concludes whether the optimal export policy would be export subsidy or export tariff in the unique feasible separate equilibrium depends on the model's parameters including domestic cost difference,political pressure and prior belief about cost type.This imp...