控股大股东与定向增发价格:隧道效应、利益协同效应及其相互影响

本文主要从控股大股东利益倾向和行为特征的角度,研究作为定向增发主要参与人的控股大股东对增发价格的影响。以2006～2009年完成定向增发的上市公司为样本,研究发现,增发价格的高低会受到控股大股东"隧道效应"和"利益协同效应"的共同作用:隧道效应促使增发价格降低,利益协同效应则促使增发价格随大股东持股比例的提高而升高。同时,研究还表明,控股大股东隧道动机对增发价格的抑价效应一直存在,不会随着大股东持股比例的提高而受到利益协同效应的削弱,而利益协同效应在大股东参与增发时则会受到隧道效应的弱化。这表明隧道效应的影响是主要的。

Controlling shareholder and Private Equity Financing Price:Tunneling,Alignment and Mutual Effect

This paper investigates the influence upon the private equity financing price by the controlling shareholders.It is shown that the price of the private equity financing can be influenced by the controlling shareholder’s "tunneling effect"and "alignment effect".Tunneling effect can reduce the price,while alignment effect raises the price.Meanwhile,the research also suggests that the under-pricing effect from the controlling shareholder’s tunneling effect can not be weakened by the alignment effect as the controlling shareholder increases its stake,but the alignment effect can be weaken by the tunneling effect.