晋升激励、专业搭配与公共卫生服务满意度

提供高质量的公共卫生服务不但是现代政府的重要职责,也是国家治理能力的重要体现。随着中国经济发展进入新常态,干部考核评价机制不断完善,地方政府官员开始重视公共卫生等民生服务,同时,官员间专业搭配也成为影响民生服务质量的重要因素。文章将2013年中国综合社会调查数据与81个地级以上城市官员的相关信息进行匹配,将上任时年龄小于55岁的官员定义为"强晋升激励"官员,而将上任时年龄大于等于55岁的官员定义为"弱晋升激励"官员。研究发现：第一,具有"强晋升激励"的市委书记和市长都有助于改善城市公共卫生服务满意度。第二,在经济较发达、政府财力较雄厚和东部地区城市,官员晋升激励的积极效应更为明显。第三,在本研究样本中,市委书记和市长"经管—理工"的专业搭配模式是提高城市公共卫生服务满意度的积极因素。在考虑了测量偏误、地区异质性、遗漏变量、样本代表性问题,并经过安慰剂检验后,文章的主要结论依然保持稳健。本研究不但有助于我们更深入地理解中国城市间公共卫生服务质量的差距及其决定因素,而且也启发我们从改善官员治理的角度来提高公共卫生服务质量,以及应对突发性公共卫生事件的能力,从而有效推进中国经济健康可持续发展。

Incentive for Promotion,Matching between Majors and Satisfaction with Public Health Services

Providing high-quality public health services is not only an important responsibility of modern governments, but also a significant perspective of state governance capacity. The sudden outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020 has spread rapidly across the country. It drags down the progress of economic development. Meanwhile, in some regions and cities, it poses unprecedented challenges to the capacity of epidemic prevention and control as well as the allocation of public health resources. What are the factors that affect the quality of cities’ public health service? It is clearly a question needs to be addressed urgently. This paper aims to answer this question from two perspectives: "promotion incentive" and "major matching". In our opinion, on the one hand, as China’s economic development has entered the New Normal, the assessment criterion for public officials are becoming diversified, which makes local officials with strong promotion incentives become more willing to improve the quality of local public health services. On the other hand, the different academic backgrounds of local officials may contribute to the "skill complementarity effect", thus exerting a positive influence on the quality of local public health services. This article matches the 2013 China General Social Survey with the personal information of city officials from 81 prefecture-level and above cities, and it defines the officials who were younger than 55 years old when they were appointed to city officials with "strong promotion incentives", and defines those older than 55 as officials with "weak promotion incentives". It found that: First, the municipal party committee secretary and the mayor either with "strong promotion incentives" has a tendency to improve the satisfaction with public health services. Second, in relative developed, or better financed cities, or cities located in east regions, the positive effects of officials with "strong promotion incentives" are even more pronounced. Third, in the sample of this article, themajors combination pattern of "econimics/management-science/engineering" between party committee secretary and mayor has a positive effect on improving the satisfaction with public health services. After taking the endogeneity into consideration, including measurement error, regional heterogeneity, variables missing and sample representativeness, along with the placebo tests, the main conclusions of this article remain robust. This article contributes to the existing literature in the following three aspects: First, theexisting studies stress that local officials with high promotion incentives pay more attention to economic growth and infrastructure construction, and thus relatively ignore the provision of livelihood services. However, this study shows that in the context of the official assessment critierion reform, officials with promotion incentives also start to attach importance to the quality of livelihood services (such as public health). Second, the existing studies focus on the impacts of management layer diversification in corporations on business performance and innovation ability, while this paper aims to reveal the impact of city leaders' major matching on the quality of local public health services, so as to provide empirical evidence for the "skill complementary effect". Third, the existing literatures have explored the determinants of the medical and health service satisfaction from the perspectives of demographics, disease types, diagnosis and treatment methods, reimbursement ratio, and health care institution status, but none of them have taken into account the promotion incentives and major matching of local officials. This paper attempts to fill this gap. In summary, this study not only gives us a better understanding of the disparities and determinants of public health service quality among Chinese cities, but also inspires us to improve the quality of public health services and the ability to cope with the public health crisis from the perspective of improving cadre governance, thereby effectively promoting the healthy and sustainable development of China's economy.