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管理层权力、薪酬差距与绩效
引用本文:卢锐.管理层权力、薪酬差距与绩效[J].南方经济,2007(7):60-70.
作者姓名:卢锐
作者单位:中山大学岭南学院,广州,510275
摘    要:已有研究发现,中国上市公司管理层的薪酬差距总体上具有锦标赛作用,即薪酬差距有利于提升绩效。但是,本文的进一步研究发现,相对于其他企业,在管理层权力大的企业中,高管团队内部的薪酬差距以及核心高管与全体员工的薪酬差距都更大。但业绩并没有更好。这些证据表明管理层权力会降低薪酬激励绩效,有必要重视管理层权力问题。研究还发现,高管团队内部的薪酬差距有利于提升绩效,但核心高管与全体员工的薪酬差距没有带来业绩的显著提升,说明公司总体薪酬差距过大可能因失去公平而影响绩效。

关 键 词:管理层权力  薪酬差距  绩效  锦标赛理论
文章编号:1000-6249(2007)07-0060-011

Managerial Power, Compensation Gap and Performance
Rui Lu.Managerial Power, Compensation Gap and Performance[J].South China journal of Economy,2007(7):60-70.
Authors:Rui Lu
Abstract:Previous studies find that the managerial compensation gap in Chinese listed companies is consistent with the tournament theory. This paper finds that the compensation gap inside the management team as well as between the core management and overall employees are higher in companies with great managerial power, as compared with other companies, while their performances are not better. These evidences show that managerial power can lower the effectiveness of compensation incentive. Our analysis also indicates that the compensation gap inside the management team will improve performance while the gap between the core management and overall employees will not improve the performance.
Keywords:Managerial Power  Compensation Gap  Performance  Tournament Theory
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