政策不确定性、财政扩张与区域商业银行风险——基于中国地方官员变更和银行业的证据

文章利用2007-2017年我国93家区域商业银行的面板数据,并结合省级宏观经济数据和地方官员变更数据,实证考察了中国地方官员变更引起的经济政策不确定性对区域商业银行风险的重要影响。研究结果表明：（1）地方官员变更引起的政策不确定性增大了区域商业银行风险;（2）地方官员变更引起的政策不确定性,通过提高银行的资产收益率降低了商业银行风险;而不确定性时期的财政扩张,通过降低银行资产收益率增大了商业银行风险;并且财政扩张的负面影响大于政策不确定性的正面影响;（3）各省的市委书记发生职位更替引起的政策不确定性对区域商业银行风险的影响更大。文章研究为新时代背景下的金融供给侧结构性改革、政府宏观经济政策的制定以及财政体制与金融体制之间的联系提供参考。

Policy Uncertainty,Fiscal Expansion and Regional Commercial Bank Risk in China: Evidence from the Turnover of Local Officials and the Banking Industry in China

Since the international financial crisis in 2008, the world economic situation is full of uncertainty, especially the impact of the deterioration of the international trade environment on the global economic development. In order to maintain the stability of China's macro-economy and give full play to the role of Finance in promoting the supply side structural reform, the 19th national Congress of the Communist Party of China regards preventing systemic financial risks as the top priority in the financial field. In 2019, the Central Committee will further "Deepening the structural reform of financial supply side" is proposed. As an important part of China's financial system, the healthy operation of regional commercial banks is crucial to economic and social development and financial stability. Therefore, it is reasonable to explore the risk sources of regional commercial banks, prevent the occurrence of systemic financial risks from the root, so as to help and improve the structural reform of financial supply side. Based on the panel data of 93 regional commercial banks in China from 2007 to 2017,combined with provincial macroeconomic data and local official turnover data, this paper empirically investigates the important impact of the economic policy uncertainty caused by the turnover of local official on the risk of commercial banks. The results show that:(1) the policy uncertainty caused by the turnover of local officials increase the risk of regional commercial banks. Specifically, when the position of local officials turnovers, the local economic policies are faced with greater external uncertainty, and the regional economic policies are faced with the possibility of turnover, which is easy to break the stable cooperation between local governments and commercial banks. Therefore, the policy uncertainty caused by the turnover of local core officials can increase the risk of regional commercial banks; (2) the policy uncertainty caused by the turnover of local officials reduces the risk of commercial banks by increasing the return on assets of banks, while the financial expansion of the government increases the risk of commercial banks by reducing the return on assets of banks during the uncertainty period, and the negative impact of financial expansion is greater than the positive impact of policy uncertainty; (3) when the positions of municipal Party committee secretaries are changed, the impact on local financial operation will be greater, so as to increase the risk of urban commercial banks. This study provides reference for the structural reform of financial supply side, the formulation of government macroeconomic policy and the relationship between financial system and financial system in the new era. Compared with previous studies, this paper has made important contributions to the literature in two aspects. First of all, although there are many relevant studies on the relationship between policy uncertainty caused by the turnover of local officials, financial expansion and corporate investment and financing behavior, these studies ignore the analysis of regional commercial banks' loan behavior, and do not consider the synergistic effect of policy uncertainty and local financial expansion on regional commercial banks'loan behavior. Therefore, this study integrates the turnover of local officials and the expansion of local finance into the same analysis framework to explore the synergistic effect of policy uncertainty and financial expansion on the loans of regional commercial banks, so as to regulate the behavior of local governments in the period of economic policy uncertainty. The second contribution relates to indicators of policy uncertainty. There are many researches on the uncertainty of policy, most of which focus on the data at the national or provincial level, but the daily operation of urban commercial banks is more affected by the actual influence of local and municipal officials. Using the data of mayors and municipal Party secretaries of nearly 400 prefecture level cities to measure the uncertainty of provincial policy, and to measure its impact on the loan behavior of urban commercial banks. This can provide a more targeted basis for the norms of local government behavior, especially in the process of high-quality economic development in China, to better play the role of local government.