纵向兼任高管能降低股价崩盘风险吗?

纵向兼任高管究竟会加强大股东对管理层的监督，减少管理层机会主义行为，提升公司治理水平；还是会强化大股东对上市公司的控制，提升其私有权收益的获取能力，增加企业风险？为此，文章将以2007年-2017年中国A股上市公司为研究样本，探究纵向兼任高管如何影响企业的股价崩盘风险。研究发现，纵向兼任高管显著降低了公司未来股价崩盘风险；在进行Heckman两阶段模型、倾向得分匹配等稳健性检验后，这一结论依然成立。同时，文章进一步研究发现，纵向兼任高管在"监督效应"和"更少掏空效应"共同作用下降低了股价崩盘风险；且当纵向兼任高管权力越大时，即纵向兼任董事长时，对公司未来股价崩盘风险的降低作用越明显。文章不但深化了股价崩盘风险影响因素的研究，而且有助于我们全面认识纵向兼任高管这一关系在公司治理中的作用，这对于完善公司治理、防范股价崩盘风险，进而促进我国资本市场的健康发展有重要的意义。

Can Vertical Interlocks of Executives Reduce the Risk of the Crash of the Stock Price?

Vertical interlocks of executives as a relationship arrangement,it reflects the vertical connection between large shareholders and management.The relationship between large shareholders and management has always been the core of corporate governance issues.However, few scholars have paid attention to the impact of this relationship on the company that how it affects the risk of stock market crash.The possible effects can be seen from two aspects:On the one hand, starting from the first type of agency theory,vertical interlocks of executives can allow large shareholders to better strengthen supervision of listed companies,so it is harder for management to hide bad news under greater external oversight,further reducing the risk of stock market crashes, manifested as a "the Supervision Effect".On the other hand, starting from the second type of agency problem,vertical interlocks of executives can strengthen the control of listed companies by large shareholders,thus making it easier to obtain private benefits for themselves.large shareholders will hide bad news in order to "tunneling" small shareholders.The behavior of hiding bad news will bring higher risk of stock market crash,this reflected as "more tunneling effectt".Of course, it is also possible that the large shareholders assign executives to the company.This will make the interests of the large shareholders more consistent with those of the appointed company, thereby reducing tunneling small and medium shareholders,that is "Less Tunneling Effect". Whether vertical interlocks of executives will strengthen the supervision of large shareholders over the management and reduce the opportunistic behavior of the management and then improve the level of corporate governance,or strengthen the control of large shareholders over listed companies and enhance their ability to obtain private equity gains and increase enterprise risks? For this reason, this paper took Chinese a-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as samples to investigate the impact of vertical interlocks of executives on the risk of crash of stock price.The study found that vertical interlocks of executives significantly reduces the risk of future crash of stock price.After heckman two-stage test, propensity score matching and other robustness tests, this conclusion was still valid. At the same time, the further research of this paper found that the greater the power of vertical interlocks of executives, namely, the vertical chairman, the more significant the reduction of the company's future stock price crash risk. The research in this paper has important theoretical contributions and practical significance.In theory, this article explores the important role of the relationship ofvertical interlocks of executives in corporate governance from a unique perspective of the risk of stock market crash.That enriches the relevant literature on the economic consequences of vertical interlocks of executives.At the same time, it also opened up a new perspective for the study of the factors affecting the risk of stock price crash.This paper helps us fully understand the role of vertical interlocks of executives in corporate governance.The research in this article shows that vertical interlocks of executives are conducive to the improvement of corporate governance and the steady and healthy development of the capital market.Vertical interlocks of executives is of great significance for improving corporate governance, preventing the risk of stock price crash and promoting the healthy development of China's capital market.