“同治”还是“同谋”:机构投资者抱团与 企业违约风险

文章以2009—2020年沪深A股非金融上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了机构投资者抱团对企业违约风险的影响及其内在机理。研究发现,机构投资者抱团可以降低企业违约风险。影响机理的检验证实,机构投资者抱团通过降低信息不对称、缓解融资约束和降低经营风险对企业违约风险产生影响。进一步从信息、资源和风险的视角探讨两者关系的异质性发现,机构投资者抱团对企业违约风险的治理效应主要体现在信息不对称程度较高、资源获取较难和风险较高的样本中。文章的发现有助于深化机构投资者抱团的经济后果与企业违约风险影响因素的研究,也为进一步完善机构投资者的制度设计、持续优化公司的内外部治理结构,防范化解企业违约风险提供了参考依据。

“Governance” or “Complicity”: Institutional Investors’ Clique and Corporate Default Risk

Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed companies from 2009 to 2020 as research samples, this paper empirically tests the impact of institutional investors' clique on enterprise default risk and its internal mechanism. The study found that institutional investors' clique can reduce the default risk of enterprises. The test of the impact mechanism confirms that institutional investors' clique have an impact on the default risk of enterprises by reducing information asymmetry, alleviating financing constraints and reducing business risks. Further exploring the heterogeneity of the relationship between information, resources and risk, we find that the governance effect of institutional investors' clique on the risk of corporate default is mainly reflected in the samples with high information asymmetry, difficult access to resources and high risk. The findings of this paper not only help to deepen the research on the economic consequences of institutional investors' clique and the influencing factors of enterprise default risk, but also provide a reference basis for further guiding and improving the institutional design of institutional investors, continuously optimizing the internal and external governance structure of the company, and preventing and resolving enterprise default risk.