隐性存款保险向显性存款保险转变对银行道德风险的影响

目前我国没有建立显性的存款保险制度，但存在着对存款人的隐陛保护。本文通过严格的模型证明了当银行特许权价值低、显性存款保险制度的可信性高，被保险存款占负债总额的比例高时，从隐性存款保险向显性存款保险转变有助于降低银行的道德风险。在此基础上．结合我国国情论证了合理的显性存款保险制度有助于降低银行的道德风险。

The Effection on Bank's Moral Hazard from Implicit Deposit Insurance System to Explicit Deposit Insurance System

There is not explicit deposit insurance system in China at present. But there exits implicit deposit insurance system. We build up a model and proof that when bank's Franchise value is low ,the credibility of explicit deposit insurance system is high and the ratio of insured depositors to total liabilities is high, it will reduce bank's moral hazard when transforming from implicit deposit insurance system to explicit deposit insurance system. On this base, the Paper demonstrates that rational explicit depositor insurance system can reduce bank's moral hazard.