上市公司发放现金股利的价值效应——基于委托代理问题视角的实证研究

现金股利发放反映了债权人、股东、管理者之间的利益分配关系,现金股利的价值效应受到委托代理问题的影响。采用2008—2017年沪深A股上市公司作为研究样本,在委托代理理论的分析框架下实证检验我国上市公司发放现金股利的价值效应。研究表明,发放现金股利可能会损害债权人利益,过度债务公司发放现金股利的价值效应较小,而债务不足公司发放现金股利的价值效应较大。基于管理者代理问题视角的研究发现,现金股利可以有效发挥降低管理者代理成本的作用,当管理者代理问题严重时公司发放现金股利的价值效应更大。基于控股股东代理问题视角的实证结果表明,现金股利可以作为替代性的治理机制约束控股股东行为,当控股股东代理问题严重时现金股利具有更高的价值效应。

The Value Effect of Cash Dividend Distribution by Chinese Listed Companies:An Empirical Research Based on the Perspective of Principal-Agent Problem

Cash dividend distribution reflects benefit distribution relationship among creditors,shareholders and managers,therefore the value effect of cash dividend is affected by principal-agent problem.Under the framework of principal-agent theory,this paper conducts an empirical test on the value effect of cash dividend distribution using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2008 to 2017.We find that paying dividends may harm the interests of creditors and the value effect of cash dividend distribution by over-leveraged firms is lower compared to under-leveraged firms.We further investigate the value effect of cash dividend distribution from the perspective of managerial agency problem.Our research shows that when firms have serious managerial agency problem,cash dividends can efficiently constrain manager behavior and the value of cash dividends is higher.Moreover,we also investigate the value effect of cash dividend distribution based on the perspective of controlling shareholder.We find that cash dividends can serve as an alternative governance mechanism.When firms’agency problem of controlling shareholder is serious,cash dividends have a better constraint effect on controlling shareholder’s expropriation so the value effect of cash dividends is higher.