领导任职期限设置的经济解释--激励与效率损失的权衡

领导任职期限制度能激励个人在管理技能培养上进行投入,这有利于增加社会总剩余;然而,任职期限制度在提供激励的同时,也造成了潜在效率的损失。领导任职期限的设置是这二者之间权衡的结果。本文通过一个两阶段博弈的分析框架,利用动态的局部均衡权衡模型,从个人收益最大化和社会总剩余最大化的相互作用中,推导出了社会最优的领导任职期限。在我们的动态的局部均衡权衡模型中,个人投入水平是任职期限制度的内生产物。

The Economic Explanation to Duration of Leader Position--Tradeoff between Incentive and Efficiency Loss

The duration of leader position provides representative individual with the incentives to invest in educating management technology, which is helpful for increasing the total social surplus. However, the duration of leader position also results in the loss of potential efficiency simultaneously. The duration of leader position is a result of tradeoff between these two sides. Making use of an analytical framework of a two-stage game and the dynamic partial equilibrium tradeoff model, this paper deduces a society's optimal duration of leader position from the interaction between personal income maximization and total social surplus maximization. In our dynamic partial equilibrium tradeoff model, the level of individual investment is an inside outcome of the leader position system.