| 国企委托代理中代理风险的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 徐麟文.国企委托代理中代理风险的博弈分析[J].华东经济管理,2003(Z1). |
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| 作者姓名： | 徐麟文 |
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| 作者单位： | 杭州商学院人文与公共管理学院 浙江 杭州 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文针对国有企业委托代理中的代理风险展开了详细的分析,首先分析了代理风险的表现形式,接着剖析了代理风险的产生原因,然后重点就委托人与代理人之间不完全信息的、非合作的博弈关系建立了相应的博弈模型,分析了模型的含义,寻求出该模型的混合策略均衡解,并就模型解提出了相应的管理策略。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 代理风险 博弈 混合策略均衡 |
The analysis of agency risk in agency-principal system of the state-owned enterprises based on the game theory |
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| XU Lin-wen.The analysis of agency risk in agency-principal system of the state-owned enterprises based on the game theory[J].East China Economic Management,2003(Z1). |
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| Authors: | XU Lin-wen |
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| Abstract: | In this paper, the agency risk in agency-principal system of the state-owned enterprises is analyzed in detail. Firstly, the appearances of agency risk are analyzed. Secondly, the causes are studied. Then, dealing with the relationship between principal and agency, a game model of incomplete information and uncooperative is established. Finally, the meaning of the game is studied, an equilibrium point under mixed strategy is found out, and corresponding strategies in management are discussed. |
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| Keywords: | agency-principal agency risk the game theory mixed strategy equilibrium |
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