个人信用的博弈模型

本文运用博弈论的方法对个人信用的运作机制进行了分析,并确定了信用申请者失信的机会成本。通过分析得出,只有在信用申请者和授信方之间信用行为的有限次博弈转化为无限次博弈之后,由于信用申请者失信的机会成本过高,信用申请者才会尽力履行信用合同,在保障自己利益的同时,亦保障了授信方的利益。

The model of game theory of personal credit

This text was used game theory to analyze the operation mechanism of personal credit, and has determined the opportunity cost that credit applicants break their promise. Through the analyzing up, only on condition of the limited times game between credit applicant and the body who authorize credit being transformed their unlimited times game, because it is too high that the opportunity cost that credit applicants break their promise, credit applicants could try their best to fulfill their credit contracts, and ensure the interests of the body who authorize credit while time of ensuring their own interests.