| 企业团队合作激励的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 丁川, 王开弘,.企业团队合作激励的博弈分析[J].华东经济管理,2007,21(9):28-31. |
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| 作者姓名： | 丁川 王开弘 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西南财经大学,经济数学学院,四川,成都,610074;西南财经大学,工商管理学院,四川,成都,610074
2. 西南财经大学,经济数学学院,四川,成都,610074 |
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| 基金项目： | 西南财经大学校科研和教改项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章建立了企业团队合作激励博弈模型.在企业团队生产中,计件工资率、团队总产出的分享和奖金差距有利于提高成员的努力水平;最优合作水平与计件工资率无关,与团队总产出的分享成正比,与奖金差距成反比.而拆台倾向的大小也与计件工资率无关,与奖金差距成反比,与团队总产出的分享成反比.并简要分析了奖金差距对拆台倾向、合作水平的影响程度以及相应的团队剩余.
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| 关 键 词： | 团队 激励 合作 拆台 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-5097（2007）09-0028-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-05-14 |
A Game analysis of the Team Cooperation Incentive Mechanism |
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| DING Chuan; ; WANG Kai-hong.A Game analysis of the Team Cooperation Incentive Mechanism[J].East China Economic Management,2007,21(9):28-31. |
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| Authors: | DING Chuan; ; WANG Kai-hong |
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| Institution: | 1.School of Economic Mathematics; Southwest Finance and Economics University; Chengdu 610074; China; 2.School of Business Management; China |
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| Abstract: | In this paper,the game models of cooperation incentive were established.In the team,it was beneficial to heighten effort standard with rate of being based on output,share of team total output and difference of bonus;the best cooperation standard had no relation with rate of being based on output,as share of team total output increased,the best cooperation standard increased,however the best cooperation standard increased as difference of bonus decreased;obstruction tendency had no relation with rate of bein... |
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| Keywords: | team incentive cooperation obstruct |
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