双边道德风险条件下的收益激励与信息租金——基于有信息委托人的视角

文章特征化了一个在投资能力方面具有私人信息的委托人，和一个在努力水平上具有私人信息的代理人，在联合生产产品时所面临的双边道德风险问题。为研究结构性信息不对称对收益激励的影响，建立了双边道德风险奈件下的收益激励模型。研究结果表明，在风险中性的委托人和严格风险规避的代理人联合生产产品时，激励努力的次优契约可以达到，只是不能为代理人提供完全的保险；在双边道德风险条件下，隐藏信息不再是有信息的局中人的最优策略，而私人信息的交换与共享可以促成次优转移均衡的实现，这说明和单边的信息不对称造成的单边道德风险相比较，结构性的信息不对称并不一定使得双边道德风险问题更严重。

Transferring Payments and Information Rents under the Double Moral-Hazard:from the Perspective of Information Agent

This paper characterizes incentive contracts for the situation where a principal is privately informed about its ability of investment and the technology governing an agency relationship. A model of incentive contracts under the double moral-hazard is constructed,in order to research the effect of asymmetric information on the transferring payments. It is shown that the optimal contract can be achieved,even in which the principal with risk neutral also participates in the production process,though the agent...