国有银行双重业务下委托代理模型研究

我国目前的经济金融发展现状决定了国有股份制商业银行不同于一般股份制商业银行，前者仍然要由政府控制，仍然需要继续履行一些金融支持的职能。文章将银行高级管理人员的活动分为经营性活动和政策性活动，在双项任务委托代理模型的框架下分析得出：其参与的政策性活动加深了信息不对称程度；现有的货币收益与控制权收益混合的激励结构诱使银行高管偏离银行利润中心，迎合政府偏好谋取职位升迁，在控制权缺乏有效监管和制约的情况下，谋取灰色收IX．，扭曲了资源配置，是其经营效率低下的根源。对此，文章建议单独核算国有银行政策性业务与经营性业务，适当补贴，重建基于经营绩效的更市场化的长效激励机制。

An Effective Principal-Agent Model in SOB's Dual Activities

State-owned banks （SOB） possess politics-business dual characteristics. The paper divides managers＇ activities into operative ones and policy ones in theoretical framework of double-task principal-agent, and has a conclusion that SOB＇s policy activities deteriorate the problem of asymmetric information; at present, money-control right mixed incentive structure induces managers to be active in policy activities, deviate banks＇ profit target and seek for control right and grey income with weak monitoring, which is the source of SOB＇s low operative efficiency and inner corruption. So, this paper points out the ways to deal with the problem： peeling policy activities off operative activities, independent accounting, feasible government subsidy, reconstructing more market-oriented long-term incentive mechanism.