| 中国零售商之间的自有品牌投资选择博弈模型研究——零售商之间的非对称双头垄断期权博弈模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 江敏华.中国零售商之间的自有品牌投资选择博弈模型研究——零售商之间的非对称双头垄断期权博弈模型[J].改革与战略,2008,24(9):137-140. |
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| 作者姓名： | 江敏华 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,上海,200083 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章通过构建一个零售商投资时机选择的非对称双头垄断期权博弈模型，来研究零售商经营自有品牌的介入时机问题，以及两个有竞争关系的零售商谁会选择、或者率先选择发展自有品牌的问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 自有品牌 博弈模型 投资决策 先动优势 |
On the Brand Investment Selection of the Retailers in China——A Game Model of Asymmetrical Duopoly Option Among Retailers |
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| Jiang Minhua.On the Brand Investment Selection of the Retailers in China——A Game Model of Asymmetrical Duopoly Option Among Retailers[J].Reformation & Strategy,2008,24(9):137-140. |
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| Authors: | Jiang Minhua |
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| Institution: | Jiang Minhua (Shanghai Jiaotong University,Shanghai 200083) |
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| Abstract: | This paper established a game model of the asymmetrical duopoly option for the retailers＇ choice of investment to analyze the timing of retailers＇ own brand and the issue of who is the first to develop its own brand in the competition. |
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| Keywords: | own brand game model invest decision in advance |
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