基于双边市场理论的网络招聘行业定价分析

本文在经典Hotelling模型的基础上,结合Armstrong(2006)提出的竞争性瓶颈模型,分析网络招聘市场平台企业该如何定价。本文创造性地放松两边用户单归属的假定。求职方单归属,招聘方多归属。本文得出结论:招聘网站的定价使得自身和求职方福利最大化,而忽略了招聘方的利益。招聘网站在求职方市场竞争求职者的加入,而在招聘方市场不相互竞争。

Network recruitment industry pricing analysis based on bilateral market theory

On the base of Hotelling Model, this article combines the competitive bottleneck model proposed by Armstrong （2006）, and analyses how the platform enterprise in network recruitment market price. It relaxes the assumption that both users are single-homing. The applicants are single-homing, while the recruiters are multi-homing. The article comes into conclusions： The recruitment websites makes their and the applicants＇ welfare maximization by pricing, but ignore the recruiters＇ interest. The recruitment websites compete for applicants＇ participation, but don＇t compete with each other in the market of recruiters.