| 国有企业委托代理问题的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 罗燕婷.国有企业委托代理问题的博弈分析[J].特区经济,2006,210(7):176-178. |
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| 作者姓名： | 罗燕婷 |
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| 作者单位： | 安徽大学,经济学院,安徽,合肥,230039 |
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| 基金项目： | 安徽大学校科研和教改项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 按照企业契约是否被终止,本文将国企企业契约分为短期契约(提前终止)和长期契约(未提前终止)两种。通过建立博弈模型,阐述不同契约形式下,股东和经理的策略变化,分析影响双方策略的因素并揭示出形成这一结果的原因,最后提出解决国有企业委托代理问题的对策建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 企业契约 博弈分析 激励约束机制 |
Analysis of SOE agent problem |
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| Luo Yan Ting.Analysis of SOE agent problem[J].Special Zone Economy,2006,210(7):176-178. |
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| Authors: | Luo Yan Ting |
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| Institution: | Luo Yan Ting |
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| Abstract: | According to whether the enterprise contract is terminated,this paper divides enterprise contract in SOEs into short-term contract(premature termination)and long-term contract(mature termination).Through setting up game models,it explains the strategy changes of shareholders and managers in different contracts,analyses influential factors and reveals reasons formed this results,and finally puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions sloving them. |
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| Keywords: | Principal - agency Enterprise contract Game analysis Motivating and restraining mechanism |
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