我国农村公共品供给诱导机制研究

出于效率考虑,发展中国家一般很少直接参与农村公共品的供给。用斯塔克博格博弈描述政府与农民生产农村公共品的过程,纵然在双方均没有公共品生产优势的情况下,作为跟随者的政府完全有动机提高农民收入以刺激农民独立承担所需公共品的投资。在城市偏向的政策下,城乡收入差距控制在一个临界点之内,使得村民自我承担的公共品投资水平随宏观经济发展不断提高。

Research of China countryside public utility supply abduction mechanism

For the sake of efficiency, developing cou ntries seldom directly participate in supplies of rural public products. By Stackelberg game, the manufacturing processes of rural public products by the government and farmers are described. Even under the condition where neither side has advantage in public products manufacturing, the government, being a follower, has absolute incentive to improve farmers income and encourages them to independently undertake the investments needed in public products manufacturing. Under the urban-inclined policies, income gap between urban and rural areas should be restricted within a critical point, which makes the investments in public products by farmers themselves increase with macro-economic development.