| 国有企业公司治理中的剩余权错配分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张东明.国有企业公司治理中的剩余权错配分析[J].湖北商业高等专科学校学报,2009(3):12-18. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张东明 |
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| 作者单位： | 吉林大学中国国有经济研究中心,吉林长春130012 |
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| 摘 要： | 改革开放三十年来，国有企业在完善公司治理方面取得的成就可归因于对国有企业剩余权配置的不断调整。当前，国有企业面临的“一股独大问题”和“内部人控制问题”同样与企业剩余权配置有关，可以看作是国有企业剩余权错配造成的。其有效解决办法在于对国有企业剩余权错配进行纠正．以优化国有企业的公司治理结构。
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| 关 键 词： | 公司治理 剩余权 一股独大 内部人控制 |
on Mismatch with Remaining Right of State-Owned Enterprises and Governance Structure Optimization |
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| ZHANG Dong-ming.on Mismatch with Remaining Right of State-Owned Enterprises and Governance Structure Optimization[J].Journal of Hubei Commercial College,2009(3):12-18. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Dong-ming |
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| Institution: | ZHANG Dong-ming (Center for China Public Sector Economy Research of Jilin University, Changchun Jilin 130012,China) |
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| Abstract: | Three decades of refomed and opening up, the governance of state-owned enterprise made great progress,the main reason is configuring the residual rights. But now, the state-owned enterprises face two questions： one is a biggest stockholder, the other is insider control. The two questions are relative to configuration of residual rights. The author thinks that configuring residual rights wrongly leads to that. So adjusting the wrong configuration is efficient measure. |
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| Keywords: | corporate governance residual rights one share dominates exclusively insider control |
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