中小企业融资难的银企博弈分析

目前，我国中小企业在融资过程中的主要困扰因素是：受规避风险和注重利益传承的影响，家族性与股权融资之间具有矛盾；银企之间缺乏信任，中小企业通过银行间接融资的门槛太高，银行惧怕融资风险，产生“惜贷”现象等。这种现状严重制约着中小企业的发展。通过构建博弈模型，在完全信息与不完全信息两种情况下对银行和企业的博弈进行了贝叶斯纳什均衡的重点分析，博弈结果表明：信息不对称是中小企业融资难的主要原因。要走出融资难的困境，中小企业应完善公司治理模式，改变“家族式”管理方式；政府应充分发挥宏观调控手段，扩宽中小企业融资渠道，健全中小企业担保体系。同时，建立并发展中小企业与银行之间契约关系也是解决中小企业融资难的有效途径。

A Game Analysis of Bank-enterprise Relations through Financing Ditculty of Medium and Small-sized Enterprises

Nowadays, the main problems in financing of medium and small-sized enterprises are that there are some conflicts between family firm and equity financing, influenced by risk prevention and interest continuity; there is lack of trust between banks and enterprises-the threshold of indirect financing is too high through banks for the medium and small-sized enterprises, the banks are reluctant to loan due to fears of financing risk. These situations seriously limit development of medium and small-sized enterprises. Through es- tablishing a game model, this paper analyzes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium on game between banks and enterprises on conditions of per- fect information and imperfect information, and the study shows that information asymmetry is the main reason of hard financing. To come out of plight, the medium and small-sized enterprises should improve the mode of corporate governance and change family man- agement, the government should play its macro-control role to enlarge financing channels and to improve guarantee system. Meanwhile, building and developing the contractual relation between medium and small-sized enterprises and banks is also an effective way to solve difficulty of financing.