社会资本与超额在职消费：激浊扬清还是推波助澜

作为企业治理的重要问题之一，代理成本诱发超额在职消费引起各界广泛关注。文章以2007-2019年A股上市公司为初始样本，考察我国各省社会资本水平差异对超额在职消费影响。研究表明，社会资本显著提高超额在职消费，起到推波助澜的负面效用；进一步研究表明，公司治理水平维度上通过提高机构投资持股比例、短期债务融资比例及扩大独立董事比例和监事会规模均能抑制社会资本加剧超额在职消费的负面效用，公司治理环境维度上通过强化企业内部治理环境、加快市场化进程亦能削弱社会资本对超额在职消费的“推波助澜”。以上结论为社会资本利弊之争提供有益补充，亦凸显非正式制度与正式制度的治理替代效应，同时为企业完善内部治理水平及政府优化制度环境与规则治理以抑制社会资本负面效用提供一定借鉴。

Social Capital and Excessive Executive PerksStirring up the Turbid or Boosting the Flames

As one of the important issues of corporate governance, agency cost induced excessive on-the-job consumption has aroused widespread concern. This paper takes the A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as the sample to investigate the impact of the differences in the level of social capital among provinces on the excessive on-the-job consumption. The results show that:social capital significantly increases the excessive on-the-job consumption. Further research shows that:in the dimension of corporate governance, by increasing the proportion of institutional investment and shareholding, the proportion of short-term debt financing, and expanding the proportion of independent directors and the size of the board of supervisors, we can restrain the negative effect of social capital aggravating the excessive executive perks, while in the dimension of corporate governance environment, strengthening the internal governance environment of enterprises and speeding up the process of marketization can also weaken the “boost” of social capital to the excessive executive perks. The above conclusions provide a useful supplement for the debate on the pros and cons of social capital, and also highlight the governance substitution effect of informal institution and formal institution, and provide some reference for enterprises to improve the level of internal governance and governments to optimize institutional environment and governance rules to restrain the negative effects of social capital.