非国有股东超额委派董事与企业现金持有

基于持股权与控制权非对等配置逻辑，文章以2009—2019年A股国有上市企业为研究主体，实证检验非国有股东超额委派董事对企业现金持有水平的影响。研究发现，非国有股东超额委派董事显著提高参股国企的现金持有水平，且随着超额委派比例增加更加显著；进一步地，该正向作用在中央层级企业及市场化进程较高地区表现更为显著；明晰其作用机理，发现其通过抑制超额持现所致的过度投资行为、迫使无效耗散的现金尽快回流进而提高持现水平；此外，非国有股东超额委派董事和超额委派比例均有助于优化现金二次配置，促使企业将超额现金用于发放现金股利及进行创新投入，并最终提升现金持有价值和企业价值。文章结论不仅印证和延伸混改推进过程中非国有资本在高层治理维度所发挥的积极作用，更为进一步深化混合所有制改革及完善中小股东保护体系提供借鉴。

Directors Excessively Appointed by Non-State-Owned Shareholders and Corporate Cash Holdings

Based on the non-equivalent allocation logic of shareholding and control rights, this paper takes A-share listed state-owned enterprises from 2009 to 2019 as the research subject, and empirically tests the impact of non-state-owned shareholders' over-appointed directors on the level of cash holdings of enterprises. The research results show that: directors excessively appointed by non-state-owned shareholders significantly increase the level of cash holdings of state-owned enterprises, and this effect is more significant as the proportion of over-appointment increases. The positive effect is more pronounced in the central enterprises and enterprises in regions with a higher marketization process. By clarifying its mechanism of action, it is found that directors excessively appointed by non-state-owned shareholders mainly suppresses the excessive investment behavior caused by excess cash holdings, forcing the cash that is ineffectively dissipated by enterprises to return as soon as possible, thereby increasing the level of cash holdings. In addition, the directors excessively appointed and the ratio of over-appointment by non-state-owned shareholders can help optimize the secondary allocation of corporate cash, prompting companies to use the increased excess cash to distribute cash dividends and invest in innovation, and ultimately enhance the value of cash holdings and corporate value. The above conclusions not only confirm and extend the positive role played by non-state capital in the high-level governance dimension in the process of mixed ownership reform, but also provide a reference for further deepening the mixed ownership reform and improving the protection system for small and medium shareholders.