实际控制人控股多家上市公司与超额在职消费

文章基于委托代理理论，从实际控制人监督职能角度，研究实际控制人同时控股多家上市公司，对管理者超额在职消费的影响。研究发现，当上市公司所属实际控制人同时控股多家上市公司时，其超额在职消费水平显著高于其它上市公司。进一步研究表明，产权性质和外部治理环境能够对二者关系产生显著影响：民营企业和分析师关注度较高企业，控股多家上市公司对其超额在职消费不存在显著影响；媒体监督较高企业和十八大之后，控股多家上市公司对其超额在职消费的促进作用受到显著抑制。文章研究不仅丰富了实际控制人监督和超额在职消费领域的相关文献，同时对实际控制人如何有效治理公司具有重要的实践意义。

The Actual Controller's Control of a Number of Listed Companies and Excessive Perquisites

Based on the principal agent theory and from the perspective of the supervision function of the actual controller, this paper studies the influence of the actual controller holding several listed companies at the same time on the excessive on-the-job consumption. We find that when the actual controller controls a number of listed companies at the same time, the level of excessive on-the-job consumption is significantly higher than that of other listed companies. Further research shows that property right nature and external governance environment can have a significant impact on the relationship between them. Private enterprises and enterprises with higher analysts’ attention, holding a number of listed companies has no significant impact on excessive on-the-job consumption. Enterprises with higher media supervision and after the 18th National Congress, holding a number of listed companies has significantly inhibited the promotion effect of excessive on-the-job consumption. This research not only enriches the literature of the actual controller supervision and the excessive on-the-job consumption, but also has the important practical significance for the actual controller to effectively manage the company.