| 不同市场力量下的再制造闭环供应链决策研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 易余胤.不同市场力量下的再制造闭环供应链决策研究[J].商业经济与管理,2008(7). |
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| 作者姓名： | 易余胤 |
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| 作者单位： | 暨南大学,管理学院,广州,510632 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章建立了由一个制造商和两个竞争零售商组成的再制造闭环供应链博弈模型,研究了制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈、零售商领导的Stackelberg博弈、制造商和零售商Nash均衡博弈等三种市场力量结构,研究和对比了三种市场力量结构下的均衡回收率、批发价、零售价、渠道成员利润、渠道总利润.研究结果表明:零售商的回收率在市场无领导者时最高,在制造商领导的市场中最低.批发价格在制造商领导时最高,最小的是零售商领导情形.零售价在制造商领导时最高,最小是市场无领导者情形.消费者和整个行业均受益于无领导者的市场结构.然而,制造商和零售商均有动机成为领导者.在具有市场领导的市场结构下,消费者和整个行业偏好零售商领导的市场结构.
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| 关 键 词： | 再制造 闭环供应链 博弈 |
Study on Decision Making in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Product Remanufacturing Under Different Market Power |
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| YI Yu-yin.Study on Decision Making in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Product Remanufacturing Under Different Market Power[J].Business Economics and Administration,2008(7). |
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| Authors: | YI Yu-yin |
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| Institution: | YI Yu-yin(School of Management,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China) |
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| Abstract: | The closed-loop supply chain game with product remanufacturing are modeled under three market structures,Manufacturer-Stackelberg market,RetailerStackelberg market,and Manufacturer and Retailer-Nash market.The optimal product return rates,wholesale price,retail prices,manufacturer and retailers profits and total profits in the channel with recovery are studied under the three market power structures.The results show that the return rate is highest when there is no market leadership,lowest when Manufacturer ... |
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| Keywords: | remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain game |
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