国有企业经营者报酬契约模型研究

随着现代企业制度在我国的建立和发展,作为现代公司治理的重要内容和公司长远发展的关键因素,激励约束机制引起了学界的广泛关注。与发达的市场经济下的企业组织相比,由于体制原因和历史遗留问题,国有企业激励约束机制的构建面临着多方面的特殊因素,存在诸多困难。本文主要分析了国有企业委托代理关系的特殊性和复杂性,通过建立国企经营者激励约束的报酬契约模型,为国企激励约束机制的改进提供一个新的思路和方法。

Research on the Compensation Contract Model for State-owned Enterprises'Operator

Along with the establishment and development of the modern enterprise system in China,the incentive and restraint mechanism,as the important content of modern company′s governance and the key of corporation long-term development,has caused widespread concern in academic circles.Compared with the developed economic entity,in the state-owned corporation,the construction of the incentive and restraint mechanisms face various special factors due to institutional reasons and historical issues,and there are lots of difficult problems.This paper analyzes the specificity and complexity of state-owned enterprises′ principal-agent relationships,then,based on that,it develops the compensation contractual model for incentives and constraints of state-owned enterprises′ operator,providing a new approach to improvement of state-owned enterprise incentive and restraint mechanisms.