上市公司盈余管理行为的博弈分析

近年来,盈余管理作为财务披露的热点问题,受到中外会计学者的广泛关注。运用博弈论的分析方法,从不完全信息静态博弈的角度,分析上市公司盈余管理,试图通过分析,从理论上揭示上市公司盈余管理是上市公司和其利益相关者博弈均衡的结果。说明在给定的制度下,各行为主体的选择行为及其相互作用机理、上市公司盈余管理的实质、存在的必然性,并在此基础上从博弈论的角度对规范上市公司盈余管理行为提出了一定的建议。

On Earnings Management of Listed Companies

In recent years, earnings management as a hot issue of financial affairs disclosure has received the extensive concern of the accounting scholars of both China and foreign countries. This paper uses the game theory , from the angle of uncompleted information static plays, to analyse earnings managemem of listed companies. The results indicate that earnings management is a balanced result of play in which listed companies play with shareholders theoretically. It proves under the given system every choice behavior may interact with the essence of earnings management. It draws some suggestions are on how to manage earnings management of listed companies in terms of game theory.