| 我国董事会约束机制现状及其问题——对我国500家上市公司的描述性实证分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 谢永珍.我国董事会约束机制现状及其问题——对我国500家上市公司的描述性实证分析[J].商业研究,2003(19):63-66. |
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| 作者姓名： | 谢永珍 |
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| 作者单位： | 南开大学,公司治理研究中心,天津,300071 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金主任基金资助(项目批准号:B04032). |
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| 摘 要： | 完善的董事会约束机制是确保上市公司董事会有效参与公司决策与监督的关键。由于我国上市公司处于由行政型治理向经济型治理转化的过程中,公司治理的各项外部监督机制如公司控制权市场、产品市场、专业董事市场等对上市公司董事会的约束力较弱。掌握董事会治理的状况,强化对董事会的约束,对提高董事会治理的效率具有一定的指导意义。
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| 关 键 词： | 董事会 约束机制 内部审计 独立董事 业绩考核 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-148x(2003)19-0063-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年3月18日 |
The Problems in Constraint Mechanism for Board of Directors in China |
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| Abstract: | The complete constraint mechanism is indispensible for listed companies' board of directors in the efficient participation in company policy-aking and supervision. Since Chinese listed companies are now undergoing the precess of transferring from administrative governance to economic governance, there is not a powerful constraint for board of directors in terms of various external constraint mechanisms such as the market of company control power, product market and specialized director market, etc. This paper is intended to promote the efficiency of board of directors governance through knowing the governance conditions and strengthening constraint mechanism for board of directors. |
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| Keywords: | board of directors constraint mechanism stock rights inner audit subcommittee independent directors performance evaluation |
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