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基于利益博弈的食品安全治理困境与对策
引用本文:杨富堂.基于利益博弈的食品安全治理困境与对策[J].商业研究,2012(5):194-199.
作者姓名:杨富堂
作者单位:郑州航空工业管理学院经贸学院,郑州,450015
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学基金项目,河南省哲学社会科学规划项目
摘    要:食品安全问题是事关消费者福祉的重要现实问题和理论问题。从食品供应链的纵向联系和食品生产企业的横向竞争来看,食品安全问题主要是食品产成品生产企业利益博弈的结果。在目前社会经济体制下,地方政府和地方企业的利益具有一致性,政府对不安全食品生产者施以较轻的惩罚不足以改变食品生产企业博弈的均衡,然而较重的惩罚又具有不可信性,这使得政府治理食品安全问题存在困境。只有从根本上改变政府利益的非独立性,明确食品安全治理的重点,强化食品生产企业的内外约束,才能有效解决食品安全问题。

关 键 词:食品安全  博弈机制  政府利益独立性

Difficulties and Countermeasure in the Governance of Food Safety Based on Interest Game
YANG Fu-tang.Difficulties and Countermeasure in the Governance of Food Safety Based on Interest Game[J].Commercial Research,2012(5):194-199.
Authors:YANG Fu-tang
Institution:YANG Fu-tang(Economics and Trade School,Zhengzhou Institute of Aeronautical Industry Management, Zhengzhou 450015,China)
Abstract:Food safety issue is an important practical and theoretical problem about the consumers′ welfare.From the viewpoint of food supply chain and competition among food manufactures,the problem of food safety is mainly the result of the game between food enterprises of finished products.In the current social-economic system,the interests of local government and local businesses are consistent.It is not enough to change the game equilibrium between food production enterprises when the government imposes light punishment to the unsafe food producers.However,a heavy punishment has no credibility.So this is a dilemma in the governance of food safety.The problem of food safety can be effectively solved only when the government is independent,the focus of food safety management is clear,and the internal and external constraints are strengthened.
Keywords:food safety  game mechanism  independence of government interest
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