不完全契约、不对称信息与银企金融交易

对不完全契约理论和不对称信息理论的分析表明,我国银企金融交易中存在的逆向选择和道德风险行为,主要源自于银企之间的契约不完全和信息不对称,而且这种不完全和不对称程度越大,企业发生违约和道德风险的可能性就越大。在WTO背景下,积极探索改善我国银企之间信用关系,营造互相信任、共同合作的经营氛围,已成为当前我国金融体制改革和经济可持续发展的基础性工作。

Incomplete Contract, Unsymmetrical Information and Financial Transaction Between Bank and Enterprise

Through analysis of the theory of incomplete contract and unsymmetrical information, this article demonstrates that incomplete contract and unsymmetrical information between bank and enterprise are the primary causes of harmful choice and moral hazard in financial transaction between bank and enterprise of China. The larger on degree of incomplete contract and unsymmetrical information is, he bigger on possibility of breaking contract and moral hazard may take place. On the basis of such analysis, the institutional arrangement and related countermeasures about credit breeding in financial transaction between bank and enterprise have put forward.