| 上市公司“隧道行为”及其治理 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈伟民.上市公司“隧道行为”及其治理[J].商业研究,2006(14):81-83. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈伟民 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京邮电大学,管理工程系,江苏,南京,210003 |
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| 摘 要： | 公司资产和利润被转移到其控制性股东手中的“隧道行为”普遍存在,在我国资本市场上,由于特殊的制度背景,这种控制性股东剥夺中小股东利益的现象表现得更为突出。治理我国上市公司“隧道行为”应依靠一套严密的规则,包括以立法和政府管制为主导的关联交易的监管;充分和严格的信息披露;尊重独立董事的意见和建立股东派生诉讼制度等。
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| 关 键 词： | 控股股东 隧道行为 治理 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-148X(2006)14-0081-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 10 7 2005 12:00AM |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年10月7日 |
The Corporate Governance of Listed Companies' Tunneling Behavior |
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| CHEN Wei-min.The Corporate Governance of Listed Companies'''' Tunneling Behavior[J].Commercial Research,2006(14):81-83. |
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| Authors: | CHEN Wei-min |
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| Institution: | Department of Management, Nanjin University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjin 210003, China |
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| Abstract: | "Tunneling" is introduced to describe the phenomenon that controlling shareholders embezzle the resources of their companies.In Chinese capital market there exist more problems that controlling shareholders deprive minor shareholders of their interest owing to this special system.The governance of tunneling behavior in Chinese listed companies need rely on a close set of rules,including legislation and governmental control on the correlation transactions,strict information disclosune system,respect for independent director and derivative action system,etc. |
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| Keywords: | shareholder tunneling behavior governance |
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