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声誉激励机制扭曲下国企经理人的行为选择
引用本文:周梦顺,张红波.声誉激励机制扭曲下国企经理人的行为选择[J].商业研究,2006(17):82-84.
作者姓名:周梦顺  张红波
作者单位:1. 湖南工业职业技术学院,财务处,湖南,长沙,410208
2. 湖南科技大学,工业工程系,湖南,湘潭,411201
摘    要:声誉作为“隐性激励”对“显性激励”的替代作用,考虑国企存在声誉激励机制的扭曲,有必要建立国企经理人的声誉模型,重点研究了声誉激励机制扭曲下国企经理人的行为选择问题,研究结果表明,国企经理人更容易采取机会主义行为,从而导致生产效率低下、经营业绩不佳。

关 键 词:声誉  激励机制  扭曲  行为选择
文章编号:1001-148X(2006)17-0082-03
收稿时间:2005-12-01
修稿时间:2005年12月1日

The Choice of Managerial Behavior in State-owned Enterprises Under the Distorted Credit Incentive Mechanism
ZHOU Meng-shun,Zhang Hong-bo.The Choice of Managerial Behavior in State-owned Enterprises Under the Distorted Credit Incentive Mechanism[J].Commercial Research,2006(17):82-84.
Authors:ZHOU Meng-shun  Zhang Hong-bo
Institution:1. Finance Section, Hunan Industrial Polytechnic Institute, Changsha 410208, China; ( 2. Hunan University Science and Technology,Xiangtan 411201, China
Abstract:The paper studies the function of credit as implicit incentives substitute to explicit incentives. A model is set up under the distored credit incentive mechanism in state - owned enterprises, which focuses on the choice of managerial behavior. The finds show managers in the state -owned enterprises can adopt the opportunism behavior easily which results in the lower production efficiency and worse management performance.
Keywords:credit  incentive mechanism  distortion  choice of behavior
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