Mitigating panic buying behavior in the epidemic: An evolutionary game perspective |
| |
| Institution: | 1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology, Nanjing, 210044, China;2. China Institute of Manufacturing Development, Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology, Nanjing, 210044, China;1. College of Economics and Management, China Agricultural University, 17 Qinghua E Rd, Haidian District, Beijing, PR China;2. School of Business, Renmin University of China, No. 59 Zhongguancun Street, Haidian District, Beijing, 100872, PR China;1. Department of Industrial Engineering, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Iran;2. College of Management Science, University of Massachusetts, Boston, USA;1. School of Business, Korea University, 145 Anam-ro, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, 02841, Republic of Korea;2. Product Development Team, BC Card Co., Ltd., 170 Eulji-ro, Jung-gu, Seoul, 04548, Republic of Korea;3. Department of Business Administration, Gyeongsang National University, 501 Jinju-daero, Jinju, Gyeongnam, 52828, Republic of Korea;1. Dr. Ambedkar Institute of Management Studies and Research, Nagpur, India;2. Symbiosis Institute of Business Management, Nagpur, Constituent of Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune, India;3. Symbiosis Centre for Management Studies, Nagpur, Constituent of Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune, India |
| |
| Abstract: | The panic buying behavior under public health emergencies will lead to many adverse consequences, such as material waste, price fluctuation and uneven distribution of epidemic prevention materials, which will pose a threat to the social stability and economic development. In this paper, we construct a tripartite game model to explore the strategic choices of the public, merchants and the government in order to effectively respond to the panic buying behavior in the epidemic. The results demonstrate that: (1) Eight evolutionary stable strategies emerge in the panic buying events. The worst scenario can be improved by adjusting some relevant parameters. (2) The probability of the public choosing the strategy of “not involving in panic buying” depends on the potential benefits and losses of snapping up, rather than the extent of price rising. (3) The probability of merchants choosing the strategy of “not bid up price” depends on the intangible benefits. (4) The probability of the government choosing the strategy of “active supervision” depends on the supervision costs and government credibility, rather than the amount of fines. In addition, strategic suggestions to mitigate panic buying behavior are put forward from the perspective of each stakeholder. |
| |
| Keywords: | Panic buying behavior Tripartite evolutionary game Evolutionary stable strategy The public Merchant The government |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
