地方利益、纵向财政关系与治理风险防范

通过分析地方政府与中央政府诸多方面存在的激励兼容问题，总结出中央政策目标与地方财政利益在区域发展平衡、改善社会福利、环境保护和财政安全等方面存在不一致给国家治理带来的风险，认为中央政府应对治理风险的政策工具单一，纵向控制力较弱。现有财税体制改革中所体现的中央适应性地强化对税收的控制、监督地方非税收入等，在防范治理风险方面存在很大局限性。提出鼓励公共参与、改善转移支付、强化地方人大预算监督等多种方式辅助纵向机制降低治理风险，促进财政在国家治理中的作用。

Local Interest,Vertical Financial Relationship and the Governance Risk Prevention

Based on the analysis of the incentive compatibility problem in multi-levels government, we summarized sever-al typical facts of interest conflict between the local governments and the central government in China. Especially, the exist-ence of local interests in regional development, social welfare, environmental protection and financial security has jeopardized the interests of the country as a whole, which put the governance of China at risk. Depending on the vertical control mecha-nism heavily, the central government has few policy tools to deal with the risk of governance effectively. The recent reform of finance system such as strengthening the control of taxation, supervision of local non-tax revenue show the efforts and difficul-ties of the central government in dealing with the risk of governance. We propose some measures to compliment and strengthen the vertical control mechanism to promote the role of finance in national governance, such as more public involvements in local affairs, refinement of vertical transfer, strengthening the local people’s Congress budget supervision, et al.