审计师变更与内部控制审计意见购买

管理层有可能与审计师合谋以获得虚假的内部控制审计意见.本文基于我国A股上市公司发布的2013~2015年年度内部控制审计报告,采用修正的Lennox(2000)审计意见购买模型以实证检验我国上市公司是否存在内部控制审计意见购买行为.研究结论表明:上市公司内部控制被出具非标准审计意见后,促使其管理层更换审计师,且上市公司更换审计师后降低了其获得非标准内部控制审计意见的概率,即我国上市公司存在内部控制审计意见购买行为,故我国政府监管部门应加强内部控制审计的规范以监督管理层与内部控制审计师的合谋,从而真正发挥内部控制审计职能.

Auditor Switching and Internal Control Opinion-Shopping

Establishing and maintaining effective internal control is the responsibility of the management, and auditors supply the assurance of the effectiveness of the internal control, but the management may conspire with the auditor to obtain false internal control auditing opinions in order to explain its fiduciary duty. Based on internal control auditing report of A-share listed companies in China from 2013 to 2015 and modified opinion-shopping model of Lennox (2000), this empirical study finds that when internal control of listed companies is issued modified auditing opinions, the management has a strong tendency to change the auditors so as to reduce the possibility of modified auditing opinion. As a result, there exists internal control opinion-shopping.