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我国上市公司大股东与中小股东企业剩余分配不均衡的权力解读--兼论我国上市公司中小投资者利益保护机制
引用本文:张屹山,董直庆,王林辉.我国上市公司大股东与中小股东企业剩余分配不均衡的权力解读--兼论我国上市公司中小投资者利益保护机制[J].财贸经济,2005(12):18-22.
作者姓名:张屹山  董直庆  王林辉
作者单位:1. 吉林大学商学院
2. 东北师范大学经济学院
基金项目:本文得到教育部重大项目(02JAZJD790008)、吉林大学哲学社会科学研究项目(2005QN016)和东北师范大学人文社会科学项目(05QNR002)的资助.
摘    要:真实经济中存在大量的大股东利益侵占现象,本文认为,这是股东经济权力天然非对等的必然结果.本文从放松股东为同一性质主体假定和股东间非对等经济权力入手,建立企业剩余分配的博弈模型,推演出大股东侵占中小股东利益过程和实现机制,指出通过控制权实现利益侵占是市场失灵的必然结果,市场机制本身无法解决.

关 键 词:上市公司  股东  企业剩余  权力
文章编号:1002-8102(2005)12-0018-05

A Study of the Unequal Power of Major and Minor Shareholders in Distributing Surplus and the Protection Mechanism of Minor Investors
ZHANG Yishan,DONG Zhiqing and WANG Linhui.A Study of the Unequal Power of Major and Minor Shareholders in Distributing Surplus and the Protection Mechanism of Minor Investors[J].Finance & Trade Economics,2005(12):18-22.
Authors:ZHANG Yishan  DONG Zhiqing and WANG Linhui
Abstract:There are many encroachments of the surplus in the real economy. This paper indicates that this is the inevitable result of unequal economic power. Relaxing the assumption that shareholders are equal in nature and considering the fact that shareholders are of unequal economic power, the paper builds the game model of firm surplus distribution and illustrates that major shareholders tend to encroach firm surplus and the mechanism of the encroachment. It is showed that the surplus encroachment is the inevitable result of market failure and cannot be resolved by market mechanism itself.
Keywords:Listed Company  Shareholder  Firm Surplus  Economic Power
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