高管薪酬、董事会治理与分类转移

本文研究了高管薪酬和董事会治理对分类转移的影响。研究表明,货币薪酬会诱使高管向上转移利得,股权激励和缺乏区分度的薪酬制度会诱使高管同时向下转移费用和向上转移利得;而勤勉、独立和两职分离的董事会能够在一定程度上识别并抑制这两种不同方式的分类转移;但董事会对分类转移的抑制程度小于高管薪酬对分类转移的诱发程度。进一步地,良好的市场、法制和媒体监督环境能够有效缓解高管薪酬对分类转移的诱发作用,而董事会能够有效弥补法制建设和媒体监督不足导致的分类转移治理缺陷,并在较高质量的审计环境下对分类转移发挥更强的抑制作用。本文首次结合制度背景和媒体监督研究了公司核心治理机制对不同分类转移方式的影响和原因,并创新性地对向上转移利得的程度进行了衡量,为监管部门及公司治理机制、会计准则的制定者提供经验证据。

Executive Compensation,Board of Directors and Classification Shifting

This paper studies the influence of executive compensation and the board of directors'governance on the classification shifting.The results show that the executive monetary compensation could induce the senior managers to carry out the classification shifting of gains while executive stock incentives and the lack of gap among senior managers'compensation could induce the classification shifting of both expenses and gains.A diligent,independent board of directors with the separation of the position of board chairman and that of corporate general manager can effectively identify and restrain these two different kinds of classification shifting.However,the board restrains to a less degree than executive compensation inducing the classification shifting.Furthermore,a good market environment,legal system and media supervision can effectively alleviate the inducement of executive compensation on classification shifting,while the board of directors can effectively remedy the defects of governance on classification shifting caused by the lack of legislation and media supervision,and exert a stronger restraining effect on classification shifting in a high-quality auditing environment.For the first time this paper combines China's institutional background and media supervision,studies the impacts of main governance mechanisms on different types of classification shifting and its reasons,creatively measures the degree of classification shifting about gains,and provides empirical evidence for regulators and the formulators of corporate governance mechanisms and accounting standards.