金融发展、银行债务与大股东隧道行为

本文选取我国沪深两市A股上市公司2005—2009年的数据为样本,实证分析了金融发展、银行债务与大股东隧道行为之间的关系。研究结果表明:银行债务对国有企业中的大股东隧道行为没有发挥治理作用;而在非国有企业中,银行债务有效治理了大股东隧道行为;进一步研究表明,上市公司所处地区的金融市场发展程度越高,银行债务对大股东隧道行为的治理作用越有效,并且这一治理作用在国有企业中更为显著。

Financial Development,Bank Loans and the Tunneling Behavior of the Controlling Shareholders

Using the data of our Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in 2005—2009 as the sample,the pape empirically analyzed the relationship among financial development,bank loans and the tunneling behavior of the controlling shareholders.We found:bank loans did not play a governance role on the tunneling behavior in state-owned enterprises;In non-state-owned enterprises,the bank loans effectively managed the tunneling behavior of the controlling shareholders;Further studies revealed that the higher of the the financial development,the more effective of the governance role of the bank loans on large shareholder tunneling behavior,and which is more significant in state-owned enterprises.