| 增值税逃税中政府、商品买方与卖方的博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 杨碧云,易行健,易君健.增值税逃税中政府、商品买方与卖方的博弈[J].山东工商学院学报,2003,17(4):26-29. |
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| 作者姓名： | 杨碧云 易行健 易君健 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 浙江大学,经济学院,浙江,杭州,310013
2. 湘潭大学商学院,湖南,湘潭,411105 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对增值税逃税问题,应用逃税理论的Allingham Sandmo模型,分析了商品的买方、卖方和政府的三方面利害关系;认为作为纳税人、商品或劳务的买方只有在与卖方合谋的条件下才能逃税,且逃税的多少取决于政府的检查概率、逃税惩罚以及纳税人的心理因素等。结合我国增值税逃税现状提出了相应的治理增值税逃税的对策。
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| 关 键 词： | 增值税 逃税 混合策略 纳什均衡 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-5956(2003)04-0026-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年9月1日 |
Game Analysis among Government,Goods Buyer and Goods Seller in Value Added Tax Evasion |
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| Abstract: | The value tax evasion relates to three aspects: government as tax collector, goods seller and goods buyer as taxpayer. The characteristics and extent of tax evasion depend on the following factors: tax rates, hidden income or unpaid tax, probability of inspection, penalty constraints, and the degree of taxpayer's risk averse as well. Government must tackle value added tax evasion through examining not only on goods-buyer but also on goods-seller. |
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| Keywords: | value added tax tax evasion mixed strategy nashi equilibrium |
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