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农村信用社改革——一项核心制度安排的分析与思考
引用本文:王桂堂.农村信用社改革——一项核心制度安排的分析与思考[J].河南金融管理干部学院学报,2006,24(6):31-34.
作者姓名:王桂堂
作者单位:河南财经学院,金融系,河南,郑州,450002
摘    要:信用社改革“花钱买机制”的方案引起了争议,改革过程当中的一些迹象表明,目前的现状与改革的期望值出现了一定的偏差。为了避免出现信用社“个别理性”与农村金融改革“共同理性”相互矛盾的格局,当局应当从改革的制度安排与游戏规则上确保“正向激励”作用的有效发挥。

关 键 词:信用社改革  制度安排  正向激励  博弈
文章编号:1008-7796(2006)06-0031-04
收稿时间:2006-08-03
修稿时间:2006年8月3日

Rural Credit Cooperative Reform An Analysis and Some Thoughts on the Core Institutional Arrangement
WANG Gui-tang.Rural Credit Cooperative Reform An Analysis and Some Thoughts on the Core Institutional Arrangement[J].Journal of Henan College of Financial Management Cadres,2006,24(6):31-34.
Authors:WANG Gui-tang
Institution:WANG Gui - tang (Finance Department, Henan University of Finance and Economics, Zhengzhou, Henan 450002, China)
Abstract:"Paying for a mechanism" in the credit cooperative reforms scheme has aroused dispute. The signs suggest that there is a certain deviation between the status quo of reform and the expectation value. In order to avoid a conflicting setup with "individual reasonableness" of the credit cooperative and "common reasonableness" of the rural financial reform, it's necessary for the authorities to ensure effectively a positive incentive function to be played from institutional arrangements and the game rules.
Keywords:credit cooperative reform  institutional arrangement  positive - side incentive  gaming
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