中央银行对问题银行救助的博弈分析

针对陷入流动性困境的银行和资不抵债的银行，中央银行有不同的处置策略：救助或者不救助。但是，由于信息不对称，中央银行在面临上述两类银行的救助申请时，可能做出错误的决策。通过建立不完全信息动态博弈分析框架，对中央银行和申请救助银行之间的博弈行为进行分析，表明：当不救助会对金融体系的稳定性产生影响时，中央银行通常会采取救助措施；为了防止资不抵债的银行冒充为陷入流动性困境的银行“骗取”中央银行的救助，必须建立事后惩罚机制；此外，中央银行可以通过对被救助银行加强监管来减小救助成本。

A Gaming Analysis on the Central Bank Salvation for Problem Banks

The central bank has different countermeasures for the banks revolving in the press of liquidity and those with no assets to pay debts： salvation or no salvation. But because of information insymmetry, the central bank will make wrong decisions when coming across applications of the above two kinds of banks. An analysis, made by establishing an uncomplete dynamic gaming analysis framework, on the gaming behaviors of the central bank and the banks applying for salvation suggests that no salvation will influence the stability of financial system, the central bank will take actions of salvation. In order to guard against cheating of banks with no assets to pay debts imitating the banks revolving in the press of liquidity, an afterward punishment mechnanism must be established. Besides, the central bank can reduce the cost of savlation by strengthening supervision over the saluated banks.