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试论我国上市公司实行经理股票期权的动因及策略
引用本文:古明加.试论我国上市公司实行经理股票期权的动因及策略[J].广东经济管理学院学报,2005,20(6):41-45.
作者姓名:古明加
作者单位:广东行政学院,广东,广州,510053
摘    要:作为薪酬制度的经理股票期权是一种长期激励机制,它将期权长期激励与工资、福利、津贴等短期激励相结合,以使经理人员利益与股东、企业利益相一致。当前我国上市公司推行经理股票期权是必要而可行的,但同时也面临不少障碍。应进一步完善上市公司内部治理结构,建立科学的绩效评价体系,完善法律、政策环境,推进我国上市公司经理股票期权制度的实施。

关 键 词:经理股票期权  必要性  障碍  策略
文章编号:1672-4100(2005)06-0041-05
收稿时间:2005-10-12
修稿时间:2005年10月12

On the motives and practice of Chinese listed companies offering stock option grants
Gu Mingjia.On the motives and practice of Chinese listed companies offering stock option grants[J].Journal of Guangdong Institute of Business Administration,2005,20(6):41-45.
Authors:Gu Mingjia
Abstract:Manager's stock option grants, as a long-term incentive method, is integrated with short-term incentive methods of salary, welfare and subsidies. It makes managers share the interests of stockholders and enterprises. It is necessary and feasible for Chinese listed enterprises to adopt this method. However, the incentive mechanism is confronted with some blocks. To push forward the grant of manager's stock option, it is imperative for the listed companies to reform in terms of internal management, establish a scientific achievement-effectiveness appraisal system. In addition, corresponding policies and law should be promulgated.
Keywords:manager's stock option  necessity  barricades  countermeasures
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