国有控股、经营者报酬和公司绩效

在晋升激励存在的情况下，研究了国有控股上市公司经营者报酬-绩效激励机制的效率。研究发现：公司绩效和经营者报酬（年薪和持股）之间存在不显著的正相关关系，增加经营者持股水平可以提高报酬-绩效的敏感性；晋升激励和报酬-绩效激励机制之间替代性不显著。这意味着，经营者报酬-绩效激励机制在很大程度上只是辅助性的激励机制，晋升激励仍然是最主要的。

State Holding, Pay of Uppermost Decision- makers and Firm Performance

This paper analyzes the efficiency of pay-for-performance incentive of uppermost decision-maker of state holding firm when it's coexistent with promotion incentive.We find that although positive relationship exists between firm performance and uppermost decision-maker's pay including annual salary and share-holdings' market value,the positive relationship is not significant in statistical and adding,the level of uppermost decision-maker's share-holdings can increase the sensitivity of pay-for-performance.The relationship between promotion incentive mechanism and the pay-for-performance incentive mechanism is substitutable,but not significant.From the above findings,we conclude that uppermost decision-maker's pay-for-performance incentive mechanism is accessorial to larger extent,and the promotion incentive mechanism is uppermost nevertheless.