代理人存在非理性心理的委托-代理模型

通过引入行为经济学中的社会偏好理论及效用模型,改变传统委托—代理模型中代理人具有自利偏好的假设前提,探讨代理人在关注物质利益和其他人的动机时所表现出嫉妒、内疚、自豪以及利他等非理性行为的新委托—代理模型。模型的研究结果表明,非理性心理在显著改变激励效率及契约结构形式的同时,也会影响委托人的收益,而且非理性代理人的行为会更加复杂,他会在非理性心理与自利之间寻求平衡。

Principal-Agent Model under Irrational Psychology of Agent

The behavioral economics indicates that people are not only pursuing their private profits but also pursue irrational psychology such as fairness and reciprocity which influencing the people's behavior.Based on the social preference theory and the utility model,this paper changes the hypothetical precondition of conventional principal-agent model,discusses a new principal-agent model which agent concerning about others' well-being and motivation and showing different kinds of irrational psychology.The results show that the irrational psychology has crucial influence on the contract structure and the incentive efficiency and profit of principal.The behavior of irrational agent is more complex and he will seek balance between irrational psychology and self-interest.