| 现金流权、超额控制与公司经营绩效 |
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| 引用本文： | 苏坤,杨淑娥.现金流权、超额控制与公司经营绩效[J].山西财经大学学报,2008,30(9). |
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| 作者姓名： | 苏坤 杨淑娥 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 上海对外贸易学院,金融管理学院,上海,201620
2. 西安交通大学,管理学院,陕西,西安,710049;上海对外贸易学院,金融管理学院,上海,201620 |
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| 摘 要： | 以2002~2006年我国民营上市公司1214个观察值为研究对象,实证检验了终极控制股东现金流权、超额控制程度对公司经营绩效的影响。研究表明:我国民营上市公司终极控制股东超额控制现象较为严重;终极控制股东的现金流权具有正的激励效应,与公司经营绩效正相关;终极控制股东的超额控制具有负的堑壕效应,与公司经营绩效负向关。
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| 关 键 词： | 终极控制 现金流权 超额控制 经营绩效 |
Cash Flow Rights, Excess Control and Corporate Operating Performance |
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| SU Kun,YANG Shu-e.Cash Flow Rights, Excess Control and Corporate Operating Performance[J].Journal of Shanxi Finance and Economics University,2008,30(9). |
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| Authors: | SU Kun YANG Shu-e |
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| Abstract: | Using a 1214 corporate-level dataset of Chinese private listed companies over the period of 2002-2006,this paper examines how cash flow rights and excess control of ultimate controlling shareholder influence corporate operating performance.The results show that: the excess control extent is very serious in Chinese private listed companies;the cash flow right has the positive "incentive effect" and positive to corporate operating performance;the excess control extent has the negative "entrenchment effect" and negative to corporate operating performance.Based on this,the paper proposed some policy suggestions. |
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| Keywords: | ultimate control Cash Flow Rights excess control operating performance |
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