非对称成本信息下的网络规制定价与进入决策

本文分析了电信产业中拥有本地市话网络的在位者在下游市场（长途电话网络）面临潜在进入者的竞争的两厂商模型。两个厂商关于成本的信息是非对称的，潜在进入者进入市场的决策将会影响下游市场的市场结构，即下游市场竞争结构不是外生的。本文认为，规制者基于社会福利最大化所设计的零售和接入价格机制，在潜在进入者的成本是私有信息的情况下，对进入决策乃至市场结构有很大的影响。

Network Regulated Pricing and Enter Decision under Asymmetric Cost Information

In this paper,we analyzed a telecommunication market, in which there is an incumbent telecommunication firm who owns a local network and faces potential competition in the downstream market(long-distance telecommunication network).Under asymmetric cost information,the enter decision of the potential competitor will affect the structure of downstream market.In other words,the market structure of downstream market is not exogenous.The retail price and access charge are regulated by the welfare-maximized regul...