地方政府干预、农村信贷资金配置与反贫困

地方政府干预农村信贷资金配置是否有助于贫困减缓?这成为现阶段扶贫开发工作中需要厘清的问题。通过构建动态面板模型,运用系统GMM对我国30个省份1988-2011年地方政府干预、农村信贷资金配置与反贫困的关系进行分析,得出以下结论:地方政府干预程度与贫困减缓存在非线性关系,即适度的地方政府干预将有助于贫困减缓,而过度的地方政府干预会形成地方政府干预陷阱,抑制反贫困效果;我国现有农村信贷资金规模有助于解决贫困人口的融资困境,实现贫困减缓,而我国的农村信贷配置效率处于低水平,对贫困减缓作用不显著;与地方政府经济干预较弱的地区相比,我国地方政府干预程度较强地区的农村信贷资金配置的规模和效率对贫困减缓效果更加显著。

Local Government Intervention,Rural Credit Capital Allocation and Anti -poverty

The local government intervention credit capital allocation can help poor rural to anti-poverty? Be present in poverty alleviation and development work need to clarify the problem. By building a dynamic panel model, using the system GMM to 30 provinces from 1988 to 2011 in our country local government intervention, the relationship between rural credit capital allocation and anti-poverty is analyzed. Conclude that China's local government intervention and poor slow inverted U type nonlinear relationship, the moderate local government intervention will help the poor to slow, and excessive local government intervention can form local government intervention trap, inhibit the anti-poverty effect; At the present stage in our country rural credit funds to help solve the financing difficulties, poor implementation poverty to slow, but our country rural credit allocative efficiency at a lower level, no significant effect on poverty slow; Compared with the local government intervention in the poorer areas, local government intervention degree of strong regional scale and efficiency of rural credit capital allocation for poor slow effect is more significant.