CEO报酬、高管博弈与公司治理——一项实证比较研究

代理理论认为,激励相容的经营者报酬机制是减少代理成本的一个重要方式.然而,在实践中这种报酬机制的设计并不必然对公司绩效产生显著的影响,二者之间呈现较弱的相关关系.董事会与CEO之间的权力博弈是影响CEO报酬和公司绩效关系的重要因素.只当董事会在博弈中占优条件下,CEO才会被授予合理的股票、期权等形式的长期激励报酬,从而强化CEO报酬和公司绩效之间的关系;而当CEO在博弈中占优时,其报酬机制的激励相容性则较弱.中国国有上市公司董事会与CEO之间的博弈扭曲了CEO报酬机制,损害了CEO报酬对公司绩效的促进作用.应当从博弈的制度环境入手矫正上述博弈机制,理顺CEO报酬机制的作用机理.

CEO Compensation, Bargaining Game and Corporation Governance——An Empirical and Comparative Study

Agency theory argues that the incentively-compatible mechanism of CEO compensation is an important way to reduce agency cost. However, this mechanism has unnecessarily brought obvious impact on corporate performance in practice and there is a relatively weak link between them. This study shows that the bargaining game between CEO and the board on authority is a key factor influencing the relationship between CEO compensation and corporate performance. CEO will be given such long-term incentive compensation as shares and options to strengthen the relationship only when the board gets advantage in the bargaining game, otherwise the incentive compatibility is weaker. The bargaining game between the board of state-owned corporations in China and the CEO distorted the mechanism, destroyed the stimulative role of CEO compensation to performance. Reconstructing the institution will be an alternative measure to correct the twisty CEO compensation mechanism.