房价与企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性

非房地产企业受房价上涨的吸引投资于房地产业务，虽然能给企业带来业绩增长，但这使得企业业绩很难衡量高管的努力程度，业绩质量也不高，根据高管薪酬的最优契约理论，企业业绩在高管薪酬契约中的使用权重会被降低。基于中国35个大中城市的房价数据以及中国非房地产业的上市公司数据，研究发现：高房价显著降低了企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性，这一影响在高管薪酬契约有效性较高时更显著；以上结论在使用DID模型控制反向因果内生性问题后依然成立。

Housing Prices and Enterprises' Executive Pay-performance Sensitivity

This paper argues that, in non-real estate businesses, high housing price attracts high investments by firms, which improve firms' performance; however, the performance is difficult to measure executives' effort, and its quality is also poor. According to optimal contract theory, the importance of firms' performance in executive compensation contracts will decline as well, indicating a decrease in executive pay-performance sensitivity. Using the house price data of 35 large- and medium-sized Chinese cities and of listed firms in China's non-real estate industry, this study reveals that high housing price significantly reduces executive pay-performance sensitivity, particularly when the executive compensation contract is effective. The above findings are robust to difference-in-differences (DID) model. The paper is not only an important supplement to the research literature on executive pay-for-performance sensitivity, but more importantly, provides a new perspective to study the impact of house price on enterprises.